In The Supreme Court of the United States

ABU BAKKER QASSIM, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

GEORGE W. BUSH, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari Before Judgment To The United States Court Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF MORE THAN 300 DETAINEES INCARCERATED AT U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTÁNAMO BAY, CUBA IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE¹

Amicus Murat Kurnaz is a Turkish national, amici Ahmed al Darby and Abdullah Ali Saleh Gerab Alsaaei are Saudi nationals, and amici Adham Mohammed Ali Awad and Zakaria Al-Baidany are Yemeni nationals who have been detained by the United States at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba ("Guantánamo") for years without charge or trial.

The remaining *amici* are more than 300 detainees at Guantánamo who have filed petitions for writs of *habeas corpus* that are pending in the federal courts. *Amici*'s cases are listed in Appendix A.

Collectively, *amici* are gravely concerned that the district court's failure to order the remedy plainly contemplated by this Court in *Rasul* v. *Bush*, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), will perpetuate the system of lawlessness and brutality at Guantánamo that has already driven many *amici* to lifethreatening despair.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Nearly two years ago, in *Rasul* v. *Bush*, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), this Court held that individuals imprisoned at Guantánamo could challenge their detention through *habeas corpus* in the federal courts. Petitioners' *habeas* petition is the only case of the over 300 *habeas* petitions filed following *Rasul* to reach a decision on the merits. After the Respondents conceded that Petitioners were "no longer enemy combatants," the district court held that Petitioners' continued detention at Guantánamo was

¹ In accordance with Rule 37.6, this brief is not authored in whole or part by counsel for any party. No person or entity other than *amici* and their counsel made any monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Petitioners and Respondents have consented to the filing of this brief. Copies of their letters of consent have been lodged with the Clerk.

unlawful. Nonetheless, the district court declared itself impotent to redress this violation of law.

The decision below drains *Rasul* of all meaning and ignores the statutory and constitutional duty of the judiciary to administer justice and check the Executive when acting illegally. Moreover, the district court disregards this Court's manifest concern about the continued detention of innocent men.

This Court's immediate intervention is required. The district court's decision traps *amici* in a system of enforced brutality, which draws no practical distinction between combatant and civilian, or innocent and guilty party. Within this system, the physical and mental health of many *amici* is rapidly deteriorating. The desperation of many *amici* — who now have been informed by a federal court that even those who are innocent and illegally imprisoned can be doomed to infinite confinement — and the imperative to lift the lingering confusion regarding this Court's decision in *Rasul*, which has produced unnecessary and harmful delay since its issuance, call for the Court to grant *certiorari* before judgment.

ARGUMENT

I. THE DECISION BELOW IS INCONSISTENT WITH RASUL.

In *Rasul*, this Court established that federal courts have authority "to determine the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing," and issued a clear mandate to the federal courts "to consider in the first instance the merits of petitioners' claims" challenging their detention at Guantánamo. *Rasul*, 542 U.S. at 484. The lower courts are obligated to follow the mandates of this Court's rulings, especially when adjudicating *habeas* petitions. *See Hutto* v. *Davis*, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982); *Harris* v. *Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286, 292 (1969) ("There is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional

system, than the careful processing and adjudication of petitioners for writs of *habeas corpus*.").

Yet the district court here only partially complied with the clear mandate of *Rasul*. While the district court recognized its authority to consider Petitioners' *habeas* claims and held that Petitioners' detention at Guantánamo is unlawful, it ultimately thwarted the adjudication of Petitioners' claims – in contravention of *Rasul* – by holding that it had no relief to offer Petitioners. The district court's decision renders this Court's opinion in *Rasul* void of any practical meaning.

A. Rasul Clearly Contemplated That The Federal Courts Would Order The Release Of Persons Unlawfully Detained At Guantánamo.

In *Rasul*, this Court confirmed the federal courts' authority to review the legality of Executive detention at Guantánamo pursuant to the federal *habeas* statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 *et seq*. By invoking "the historic purpose" of the common law writ of *habeas corpus*, this Court made clear that its decision that the federal courts have *habeas* jurisdiction means that they have the power to order the release of prisoners found to have been confined unlawfully by the Executive. *Rasul*, 542 U.S. at 474 (citing *Brown v. Allen*, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)).

It is inconceivable under the common law – and likewise under the *habeas* statute – for a *habeas* court to countenance a prolonged Executive detention it found unlawful. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202 (1830) ("habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the great object of which is liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause"); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 136 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.) (concluding that "the crime with which the prisoners stand charged has not been committed," and thereby determining that the Court "can only direct them to be

discharged"); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (habeas corpus affords a "swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement"). Indeed, the protections of habeas corpus are "strongest" in the context of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, Rasul, 542 U.S. at 474 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)), since such detention lacks the safeguards of an antecedent judicial trial. See also id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that indefinite detention suggests "much greater alignment with the traditional function of habeas corpus").

The district court's refusal to provide redress to Petitioners nullifies the authority granted by this Court to hear the merits of *habeas* petitions filed by detainees at Guantánamo. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (rights are "of no value" where there is no remedy available for violations thereof). The district court acknowledged that the only satisfactory remedy here would be Petitioners' release from Guantánamo, but it decided that it could not order that relief, or any other. Accordingly, Petitioners – and potentially amici – are placed in the same position as if this Court in Rasul had affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of such habeas petitions.

B. The Ruling Below Is Inconsistent With The Core Concept Of Judicial Review.

By failing to remedy Petitioners' unlawful detention, the district court abdicated its constitutional duty to administer justice and to check the unlawful acts of the Executive. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974). As this Court held at the same time it decided Rasul, "habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an important judicial check on the Executive's discretion in the realm of detentions." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). This Court in Rasul specifically emphasized this judicial role, and rejected the Executive's claim of unilateral decision-making authority,

by recognizing "the federal courts' power to review applications for habeas relief in a wide variety of cases involving Executive detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace." *Rasul*, 542 U.S. at 474-75 (reviewing *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), *Ex parte Quirin*, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) and *In re Yamashita*, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)).

Accordingly, this Court directed the federal courts to proceed to the merits of *habeas* petitions filed by Guantánamo detainees. This Court has held that "[t]here is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional system, than the careful processing and adjudication of petitions for writs of *habeas corpus*," *Harris*, 394 U.S. at 292, and has recognized that ordering a remedy in cases implicating the Executive's powers to regulate foreign policy "will often call for difficult judgments," *see Zadvydas* v. *Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 700-01 (2001). Yet, rather than adhere to these principles and accept the challenge of full adjudication, the district court simply wrote the judicial branch out of the constitutional scheme.

The district court's decision not only is clearly erroneous, but also very dangerous in its practical effect. Despite this Court's decision rendered almost two years ago, amici's efforts to vindicate their potentially meritorious legal and factual claims have been stymied, as the lower courts' processing of their cases has grown entangled in a legal morass. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (granting certiorari before judgment because issue of constitutionality of sentencing guidelines had "imperative public importance" and was causing "disarray among the Federal District Courts"). This Court should

² The fact that Petitioners' appeal is now proceeding before the Court of Appeals does nothing to improve this situation. Any ruling by the Court of Appeals will inevitably be the subject of a challenge here. In the meantime, the cases of the hundreds of *amici* submitting this brief will continue at a standstill as long as it remains undecided whether the federal courts can order the release of unlawfully detained persons.

grant *certiorari* before judgment to resolve the federal courts' apparent confusion about the intended application of *Rasul*.

C. The District Court's Decision Undermines This Court's Manifest Concern About The Continued Imprisonment Of Innocent Men At Guantánamo.

This Court was particularly disturbed in *Rasul* about the plight of detainees who are factually innocent of wrongdoing or wrongly classified as "enemy combatants." Such individuals, this Court wrote, "unquestionably" are entitled to relief under the *habeas* statute:

Petitioners' allegations — that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing — unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'

Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)); see also id. at 476 (distinguishing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), on the grounds that Guantánamo prisoners "are not nationals of countries at war with the United States and deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United States" and "have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing"); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (ordering district courts "to consider in the first instance the merits of petitioners' claims" that they are "wholly innocent of wrongdoing"); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530 (recognizing that the "risk of erroneous deprivation" of liberty through "mistaken military detentions" is "significant").

Petitioners are far from the only innocent noncombatants languishing at Guantánamo. The U.S. military concedes that at least seven other detainees imprisoned at Guantánamo are not "enemy combatants."3 Moreover, many *amici* believe that any fair review system will show that they too are non-combatants and "wholly innocent of wrongdoing." Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484. For example, amicus Murat Kurnaz, a 23-year-old Turkish national commencing his fifth year of imprisonment, is detained largely on the claim that his friend "engaged in a suicide bombing" long after Mr. Kurnaz arrived in Guantánamo. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 470 (D.D.C. 2005). Not only is the claim factually preposterous - the friend in question is alive and well and under no suspicion by relevant authorities of committing any such act – but Mr. Kurnaz's complete file also demonstrates that the U.S. military itself recognizes that he has no connections with any terrorist organization.4

In addition, cases of mistaken identity are routine at Guantánamo. Detainee 581 was seized from his village in Pakistan and accused of being Abdur Rahman Zahid, a former Taliban deputy foreign minister suspected of murdering Afghans and looting antiquities. But, the detainee said his name was actually Abdur *Sayed* Rahman, not Abdur *Rahman* Zahid, and that he was "only a chicken farmer in Pakistan." There is no evidence or

³ Seven of these detainees have *habeas* petitions pending in the federal courts. *See El-Mashad, et al.* v. *Bush*, No. 05-0270 (D.D.C.); *Kiyemba* v. *Bush*, No. 05-1509 (D.D.C.); *Mamet, et al.* v. *Bush*, No. 05-1886 (D.D.C.); *Zakirjan* v. *Bush*, No. 05-2053 (D.D.C.); *Boucetta* v. *Bush*, No. 05-2087 (D.D.C.). All seven of these detainees are *amici* here. *See* Appendix A.

⁴ See Carol D. Leonnig, Panel Ignored Evidence on Detainee; U.S. Military Intelligence, German Authorities Found No Ties to Terrorists, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2005, at A1.

Department of Defense, Reprocessed Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) and Administrative Review Board (ARB) Documents, (Continued on following page)

suggestion that he engaged in any violent act. Many detainees, like Detainee 919, an Afghan named Faiz, apparently were presented to U.S. forces as a result of local grievances. Faiz testified that he was actually attempting to recover stolen land deeds stolen *from* the Taliban when a local official involved in the land deal accused him of Taliban membership. ⁶ According to Faiz:

My hands are farmer's hands, marked by sickles ... I wasn't a big person. I didn't have that power. You think about it yourself. When [the Taliban] beat us, they took our land. If the Americans hadn't come, they would have killed us all.⁷

Detainee 963, a farmer, was riding a tractor to town to buy motor oil when he pulled over to allow a U.S. convoy to pass. He wore no uniform and had no weapon; yet "[n]ow I am here for two years and nobody knows why." He is not alleged to have engaged in any violent act. For Detainee 339, a Saudi, the allegation against him appears to be that he spent time in a Taliban guesthouse. He was found, as Brigadier General Martin Lucenti has said about the majority of the detainees, running – not fighting. 10

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt/index.html (Mar. 3, 2006) [hereinafter "DOD Documents"], Set 3 at 00272-94.

⁶ DOD Documents, Set 31 at 2172-81.

⁷ *Id.* at 2175.

⁸ DOD Documents, Set 27 at 01901-13.

⁹ DOD Documents, Set 21 at 01645-88; see also Tim Golden, Voices Baffled, Brash, and Irate at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2005, at A10 (describing testimony of many Guatánamo detainees recently made public); Andrew Selsky, Varied Tales Emerge from Guantanamo Files, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 4, 2006.

¹⁰ See Mark Huband, US Officer Predicts Guantanamo Releases, Fin. Times, Oct. 5, 2004 (stating that "[o]f the 550 [detainees] that we have, I would say most of them, the majority of them, will either be released or transferred to their own countries. . . . Most of these guys weren't fighting. They were running"), available at http://news.ft.com/ (Continued on following page)

U.S. military officials repeatedly have corroborated *amici*'s claims of innocence. A 2002 CIA report concluded that "a substantial number of the detainees appeared to be either low-level militants . . . or simply innocents in the wrong place at the wrong time." An active duty intelligence officer assigned to Guantánamo agreed that "the United States is holding dozens of prisoners at the U.S. Navy Base at Guantanamo who have no meaningful connection to al-Qaida or the Taliban and is denying them access to legal representation. . . . There are a large number of people at Guantanamo who shouldn't be there."

Indeed, a recent, comprehensive analysis of documents released by the Department of Defense reveals in stark statistical terms that a great number of detainees may be incarcerated unjustly at Guantánamo. ¹³ According to this review, an astounding 86 percent of detainees were arrested and delivered to U.S. custody by Pakistan or the Northern Alliance after the military offered large financial bounties for

cms/s/192851d2-163b-11d9-b835-00000e2511c8.html; John Mintz, $Most\ at\ Guantanamo\ to\ Be\ Freed\ or\ Sent\ Home,\ Officer\ Says,\ Wash.\ Post,\ Oct.\ 6,\ 2004,\ at\ A16.$

¹¹ See also Tim Golden and Don Van Natta, Jr., U.S. Said to Overstate Value of Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 21, 2004, at A01 (reporting that "[o]fficials of the Department of Defense now acknowledge that the military's initial screening of the prisoners for possible shipment to Guantanamo was flawed").

¹² Samara Kalk Derby, *How Expert Gets Detainees to Talk*, The Cap. Times & Wis. St. Journal, Aug. 16, 2004, at 1A; *Frontline: Son of Al Qaeda* (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 11, 2004), transcript, *available at* http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/khadr/interviews/khadr.html (quoting CIA operative who spent a year undercover at Guantanamo as estimating that "there's only like 10 percent of the people that are really dangerous, that should be there and the rest are people that don't have anything to do with it, don't even, don't even understand what they're doing here").

¹³ Mark Denbeaux et al., Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of Department of Defense Data, Seton Hall University School of Law (2006), http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf.

the capture of Arab terrorists.¹⁴ The government's own evidence reveals that a vast majority of detainees never participated in any "hostile act" against the United States or its allies, but are detained because of a varyingly loose "association with" one of 72 groups the military has asserted have some unspecified connection to al Qaeda.¹⁵ According to the Department of Defense, only eight percent of detainees are believed to be al Qaeda fighters;¹⁶ many are detained simply because they wore Casio watches or olive drab clothing.¹⁷

Amici, many of whom believe that they will be able to demonstrate their innocence if provided a fair opportunity to do so, thus share Petitioners' grave concern that the decision below impermissibly perpetuates a system that "allows friends and foes alike to remain in detention." *See Rasul*, 542 U.S. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

II. THIS COURT'S IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION IS REQUIRED BECAUSE FURTHER DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING RASUL THREATENS THE LIVES AND DENIGRATES THE HUMANITY OF MANY DETAINEES AT GUANTÁNAMO.

Amici recognize that, regardless of how deeply misguided the decision below may be, the grant of *certiorari* before judgment is an extraordinary remedy. This, however, is an extraordinary case.

In place of the judicial review promised by *Rasul* nearly two years ago, brutality and lawlessness predominate at Guantánamo. The conditions of confinement and interrogation are designed to produce disorientation and despair among detainees. Among other things, U.S.

¹⁴ *Id.* at 2-3.

¹⁵ *Id.* at 4, 17.

¹⁶ *Id*.

¹⁷ *Id.* at 20.

military interrogators continually tell many *amici* that the law and lawyers are of no use to them¹⁸ and that they will never be released. The district court's refusal to order the release of Petitioners, who are concededly innocent men, reinforces these lies and will deepen the widespread despair that has already driven hundreds of detainees to lifethreatening hunger strikes and repeated suicide attempts.

A. Abusive Conditions And Treatment Have Prevailed At Guantánamo For Over Four Years.

A variety of outside observers, including the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), ¹⁹ the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), ²⁰ and the United Nations ("UN"), ²¹ have concluded that tactics frequently employed by many personnel at Guantánamo are tantamount to torture and seriously have compromised the health of hundreds of detainees. Techniques officially approved for use at Guantánamo include isolation for up to thirty days; 28-hour interrogations; extreme and prolonged stress

¹⁸ See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Eroding Inmates' Trust at Cuba Base, Lawyers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at A18 (reporting that interrogators try to convince detainees not to trust lawyers by telling them that the lawyers are Jews and by posing as lawyers during interrogations).

 $^{^{^{19}}}$ See Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at A1.

²⁰ United States Department of State, *Charges of Guantánamo Detainee Torture Unfounded, General Says*, State Dep't Press Releases & Documents, Jul. 14, 2005, *available at* http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2005/Jul/15-641403.html (reporting that Defense Department investigation into torture at Guantánamo was "a result of more than two-dozen e-mails from FBI personnel alleging mistreatment of detainees in the second half of 2002" and that "the FBI e-mails contained a reference to 'torture techniques' in Guantánamo").

 $^{^{21}}$ See also United Nations Commission on Human Rights, situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Feb. 15, 2005, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/docs/62chr/E.CN.4.2006.120_.pdf (hereinafter "UN Report").

positions; sleep deprivation; sensory assault; deprivation of clothing; hooding; and the abusive use of dogs. ²²

The ICRC, whose investigative team spent most of June 2004 at Guantánamo, reported that "investigators had found a system devised to break the will of the prisoners at Guantánamo . . . through 'humiliating acts, solitary confinement, temperature extremes, [and] use of forced positions.'"23 The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture concluded that interrogation techniques used at Guantánamo, "in particular the use of dogs, exposure to extreme temperatures, sleep deprivation for several consecutive days and prolonged isolation were perceived as causing severe suffering. . . . [T]he simultaneous use of these techniques is even more likely to amount to torture."24 Indeed, government officials acknowledge that psychologists and psychiatrists working in "Behavioral Science Consultation Teams" have conducted a remarkable "experiment" at Guantánamo.25 According to an "affiliate" of this program, these teams have sought to "reverseengineer" torture and interrogation techniques that the military trains U.S. forces to withstand, in order to create the "radical uncertainty" necessary to "break" the detainees.²⁶

²² See Pentagon Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism (Apr. 4, 2003), reprinted in The Torture Papers at 340-43 (Karen J. Greenberg, et al. eds., 2005); Action Memo from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to Secretary of Defense (Nov. 27, 2002), reprinted in The Torture Papers, supra, at 237.

²³ Lewis, *Red Cross*, *supra* note 19.

²⁴ UN Report, *supra* note 21, at 25.

 $^{^{\}scriptscriptstyle 25}$ Jane Mayer, The Experiment, The New Yorker, July 11 & 18, 2005, at 63.

 $^{^{26}}$ *Id*.

Reports show that physical abuse is routine at Guantánamo.²⁷ For example, FBI documents reveal that agents witnessed: a female interrogator grab the genitals of a detainee and bend his thumbs back; a detainee gagged with his head wrapped in duct tape;²⁸ a detainee left in isolation for three months in a cell constantly flooded with bright light, who afterwards showed signs of "extreme psychological trauma;"²⁹ detainees left chained "hand and foot in a fetal position to the floor, with no chair, food or water," for periods of 24 hours or more;³⁰ and a detainee left in an unventilated interrogation room with no air conditioning with the temperature "well over 100 degrees."³¹

Another procedure used on many "uncooperative prisoners" involves forcing them to strip to their underwear, shackling them hand and foot to a bolt in the floor, and forcing them to endure strobe lights, painfully loud music, and freezing temperatures, for sessions lasting up

Beatings are the most frequently reported form of mistreatment among Guantánamo detainees, with no less than 45 *amici* and other detainees represented by counsel alleging that they have experienced physical mistreatment. In a report issued by the U.S. Southern Command, video tapes of the activities of the "Immediate Reaction Force," comparable to a riot squad, revealed questions about abuse and misconduct, and included footage of an IRF guard repeatedly pepper spraying a detainee and taunting him, a guard tying a detainee to a gurney for interrogation, and other physical assaults. *Report: Video Shows Gitmo Abuse* (CBS News television broadcast Feb. 1, 2005), *available at* http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/0204/terror/main671682. shtml.

 $^{^{28}}$ Paisley Dodds, $\it Guant\'anamo$ $\it Protest:$ 23 tried suicide, Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 25, 2005, at A02.

²⁹ Dana Priest and Dan Eggen, *Terror Suspect Alleges Torture*, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, at A01.

³⁰ Carol D. Leonnig, Further Detainee Abuse Alleged Guantánamo Prison Cited in FBI Memos, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2004, at A01.

³¹ Kate Zernike, Newly Released Reports Show Early Concern on Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A1.

to fourteen hours.³² Former interrogators at Guantánamo confirm accounts of "inmates being shackled for hours and left to soil themselves while exposed to blaring music."³³

Sexual provocation, humiliation, and abuse also have been widely reported and in many cases confirmed by the military. 34 A former army intelligence analyst at Guantánamo has revealed that interrogators systematically use sex to unnerve detainees during interrogation.³⁵ That account has been confirmed in a report by Physician for Human Rights.³⁶ Detainees allege that they have been threatened with sexual violence for failure to cooperate with interrogation. O.K. v. Bush, No. 04-1136 (D.D.C. July 12, 2005) (Mem. Op. denying motions for preliminary injunctions).³⁷ There are reports of interrogators forcing detainees to look at pornographic videos.³⁸ Recently released FBI memos report that military interrogators "wrapped terrorism suspects in an Israeli flag and forced them to watch homosexual pornography under strobe lights during interrogation sessions that lasted as long as

 $^{^{\}rm 32}$ Neil A. Lewis, Broad Use of Harsh Tactics is Described at Cuba Base, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 2004, at A1.

³³ Neil A. Lewis, *Fresh Details Emerge on Harsh Methods at Guantánamo*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A11. Former military guards, intelligence agents, and others at Guantánamo also report that severe sleep deprivation in connection with interrogations is a common practice. Lewis, *Broad Use of Harsh Tactics*, *supra* note 32.

³⁴ See Carol D. Leonnig and Dana Priest, Detainees Accuse Female Interrogators; Pentagon Inquiry is Said to Confirm Muslims' Accounts of Sexual Tactics at Guantánamo, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 2005, at A01.

³⁵ Mayer, *supra* note 25, at 65.

³⁶ Physicians for Human Rights, *Break Them Down, Systematic Use of Psychological Torture by U.S. Forces* 10 (2005), *available at* http://www.phrusa.org/research/torture/pdf/psych_torture.pdf (hereinafter "Physicians for Human Rights Report").

³⁷ A number of detainees allege that guards raped several young prisoners in isolated sections of the prison. Leonnig, *Further Detainee Abuse*, *supra* note 30.

³⁸ Physicians for Human Rights Report, *supra* note 36, at 11.

18 hours."³⁹ These abuses are precisely the type documented at Abu Ghraib, the U.S. detention facility administered by Army Major General Geoffrey Miller, in an effort to "Gitmo-ize" the now-notorious Iraqi prison.⁴⁰

Conditions of confinement at Guantánamo also maximize isolation and anxiety, further dehumanizing detainees and undermining their ability to withstand interrogation. Detainees are housed in six-by-eight foot cells and are permitted to leave only for interrogation and one hour of outside exercise per week. Brief for the Guantánamo Detainees at 5-7, *Al Odah v. United States*, Nos. 05-5064, 05-5095 through 05-5116 (D.C. Cir. June 10, 2005). Detainees are held virtually *incommunicado*, permitted to receive correspondence only from their attorneys and "the occasional, often heavily censored, letters" from family. Even letters from detainees' young children are censored.

³⁹ Drew Brown, *FBI Blasts Interrogators; Memo indicates detainees were clad in Israeli flags and shown porn under strobe lights*, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 24, 2006, at A15.

⁴⁰ See Josh White, Army General Advised Using Dogs at Abu Ghraib, Officer Testifies, Wash. Post., July 28, 2005, at A18 (reporting that Army Major General Geoffrey D. Miller stated that he wanted to "Gitmo-ize" Abu Ghraib). See also See No Evil, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 15, 2005, at B8 (reporting that Maj. Gen. Miller was assigned to Iraq in September 2003, and "that fall, the military began employing Guantánamo tactics on Abu Ghraib prisoners, using sexual humiliation and working dogs in interrogations").

⁴¹ See UN Report, supra note 21, at 25 (concluding that conditions of detention "seem to have been used to 'counter resistance' and to cause stress. [And, they are] closely linked with investigation techniques").

⁴² Mayer, *supra* note 25, at 60.

⁴³ Amnesty International, Guantánamo: Lives Torn Apart – The Impact of Indefinite Detention on Detainees and their Families (Feb. 6, 2006), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510072006 (hereinafter "Amnesty Report").

⁴⁴ Abdulrahman Fakhri, *US Censoring Letters Written by Children*, GULF DAILY NEWS, Apr. 18, 2005.

B. Hunger Strikes And Suicide Attempts Are Widespread At Guantánamo.

The brutal detention and interrogation system at Guantánamo, as well as the chronic legal uncertainty that the district court's decision will only perpetuate, has produced the expected outcome: feelings of total hopelessness and desperation that have driven many detainees to repeated attempts to take their own lives. This system, which has developed in place of law at Guantánamo, is perpetuated by the federal courts' failure to vindicate the rights of detainees – including concededly innocent ones such as Petitioners.

Over two years ago, the ICRC warned that prolonged solitary confinement and indefinite detention at Guantánamo inevitably would compromise the mental health of detainees. 46 When the ICRC visited Guantánamo in June 2004, it found high incidences of mental illness produced by stress, particularly attributable to prolonged solitary confinement and often resulting in "self-harm and suicide attempts." The UN Report also found that "conditions [at Guantánamo] have led in some instances to serious mental illness, over 350 acts of self-harm in 2003 alone, individual and mass suicide attempts and widespread, prolonged hunger strikes."

⁴⁵ Psychologists have long known that "the indeterminacy of prison terms, and the absence of any program leading to release from isolation" can lead to a "pervasive . . . hopelessness," and "deep feelings of despair," causing prisoners to resort to "extreme actions, and desperate solutions." Physicians for Human Rights Report, *supra* note 36, at 65-66 (quoting Brief of Professors and Practitioners of Psychology and Psychiatry as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 18, *Wilkinson* v. *Austin*, 125 S.Ct. 2384, No. 04-495 (Mar. 3, 2005)).

⁴⁶ Lewis, Red Cross, *supra* note 23.

⁴⁷ Physicians for Human Rights Report, *supra* note 36, at 10.

⁴⁸ UN Report, *supra* note 21, at 31.

In 2005, many detainees waged prolonged hunger strikes at Guantánamo, and dozens were hospitalized.49 Through their lawyers, many detainees explained that the hunger strike began in the early summer to demand protection under the Geneva Conventions; adequate food, water and medical care; and respect for the detainees' religious observance. See, e.g., Pls.-Pet'rs Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Ex. E (Decl. of Thomas B. Wilner) ¶ 8, Al Odah v. United States, No. 02-0828 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2005) (documenting statements of Saad Al-Azmi). By August, however, it became clear that the hunger strikers believed their situation was hopeless and were "determined to commit suicide to protest their indefinite confinement."50 One detainee reported to his lawyer that he had lost all faith in the federal courts to stop his indefinite detention. He vowed to "not eat again until he is released or charged" because "the only control he has at Guantánamo is over what he eats . . . " See Wilner Decl. ¶ 6, Al Odah (recording comments of Mohammed Al Daihani). Another detainee explained the fatalistic motivation for his hunger strike as follows: "I am dying here every day, mentally and physically. This is happening to all of us. We have been ignored ... I would rather hurry up a process that is going to happen anyway."51

⁴⁹ Amnesty Report, *supra* note 43, at 1.

 $^{^{50}}$ See Tim Golden, Tough U.S. Steps in Hunger Strike at Camp in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006, at A1.

⁵¹ See Amnesty Report, supra note 43, at 2. One young detainee (a juvenile when captured) was prompted to eat by promises about improved conditions and release, but reinstated his hunger strike in an act of obvious despair when it became clear that the promises were unfounded. See Supp. Decl. by Julia Tarver, Esq., ¶¶ 5-6, Al Joudi v. Bush, No. 05-0301 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2005). The renewed hunger strike and the government's brutal forced-feeding have had appalling consequences for this young man. Id. ¶ 7 (noting the "emaciated" Al-Sheri "had lost a disturbing amount of weight," had "difficulty speaking because of lesions in his throat that were a result of the involuntary forced-feeding," and "winced in pain" as he talked). His attorney noted (Continued on following page)

While the exact number of detainees affected by the crisis is difficult to confirm, the Government has acknowledged that the hunger strike reached an apex of 130 detainees in the fall of 2005. That number has since declined only after remarkably harsh and painful involuntary feedings. In spite of the government's severe response, hunger strikes at Guantánamo are likely to continue. 4

Ongoing suicide attempts and incidents of self-inflicted harm are further evidence of the acutely unbearable conditions at Guantánamo.⁵⁵ One mental health

in October that he could no longer walk, had lost some of his vision, and vomited every day. Id. ¶ 18. Al-Sheri has provided his attorneys with his last will and testament, fully anticipating that he will die at Guantánamo. Id.

⁵² See Golden, Tough U.S. Steps, supra note 50 (citing information from chief military spokesman at Guantánamo Lt. Col. Jeremy M. Martin). Detainees have reported higher numbers of participants. See Red Cross Confirms Guantánamo Hunger Strike, REUTERS, Oct. 7, 2005 (reporting account that 200 of Guantánamo's 500 detainees were striking).

⁵³ See Golden, Tough U.S. Steps, supra note 50 (noting that guards have placed hunger strikers "in isolation for extended periods" in "uncomfortably cold isolation cells," have denied detainees blankets and books, and have used "anti-riot control soldiers" to restrain detainees during forced-feedings).

⁵⁴ Eric Schmitt and Tim Golden, *Force-Feeding at Guantánamo Is Now Acknowledged*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at A6 (reporting that the military commander responsible for the Guantánamo Bay detention center confirmed that officials have turned to more aggressive methods to deter prisoners who were carrying out long-term hunger strikes); Golden, *Tough U.S. Steps, supra* note 50 (noting that Guantánamo "has been beset by hunger strikes almost since it was established in January 2002" and that military officials have acknowledged their use of "involuntary feeding" to quash hunger strikes as early as 2002).

⁵⁵ As of March 9, 2003, twenty detainee suicide attempts had been reported. Physicians for Human Rights Report, *supra* note 36, at 52 (citing Don Van Natta, Jr., *Questioning Terror Suspects In a Dark and Surreal World*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at A1). Since then, there have been many more, including a mass suicide attempt in August 2003 in (Continued on following page)

expert has noted the "extraordinarily high number" of suicide attempts at the camp as "compared with other prison populations."56 The case of detainee Jumah al-Dossari, a detainee who has attempted suicide nine times between March 2003 and November 16, 2005, is illustrative. See Resp'ts Opp'n to Pet'rs Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj., Ex. 2 (Decl. of Dr. John S. Edmondson) ¶ 10, Almurbati v. Bush, No. 05-1227 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2005). The government held Mr. al-Dossari in virtual total isolation from May 2004 until very recently and frequently kept him in uncomfortably cold conditions with fluorescent lights glaring 24 hours a day. See Colangelo-Bryan Decl. ¶¶ 27-28, Almurbati. In arguing that Mr. al-Dossari was not isolated from human contact, the government offered the absurd defense that he was afforded 29 opportunities to "interact" with government interrogators. See Resp'ts Opp'n to Pet'rs Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj. at 6, Almurbati.

Mr. al-Dossari recently hung himself and slashed his arm during a break from visiting with his attorney. *See* Mem. of Law in Supp. for a TRO and Prelim. Inj., Ex. B (Decl. of Joshua Colangelo-Bryan, Esq.) ¶¶ 35-38, *Almurbati* (Nov. 4, 2005). He later explained that he tried to kill himself while his attorney was present because if he died without an outside witness, "nobody would have known what happened." ⁵⁷

which 23 detainees attempted to hang themselves. *Mass Guantánamo Suicide Protest*, BBC NEWS, Jan. 25, 2005 (quoting Army spokesman Lt. Col. Sumpter), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4204027.stm. In 2004, alone, the army reported 110 incidents of self-harm by detainees at Guantánamo. *Id.* (quoting Lt. Col. Sumpter and Army Gen. Jay Hood).

⁵⁶ Van Natta, *Questioning Terror Suspects, supra* note 55 (quoting Dr. Terry Kupers, a psychiatrist who has studied mental health in prisons).

 $^{^{\}rm 57}$ This American Life: Episode 310 (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 12, 2005), available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org (interview with Joshua Colangelo-Bryan).

CONCLUSION

The need for this Court to uphold the rule of law by ordering the implementation of the mandate of *Rasul* is both plain and urgent. *Amici* urge this Court to grant the petition for a writ of *certiorari* before judgment. Respectfully submitted,

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