(Article from Insurance Law Alert, October 2020)
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The Connecticut Supreme Court dismissed a putative class action seeking medical monitoring relief, finding that even if Connecticut law recognized such a claim, plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether medical monitoring was “reasonably necessary.” Dougan v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 2020 WL 5521391 (Conn. Sept. 14, 2020).
Several workers sued Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation and others after being exposed to asbestos during a construction project. The complaint alleged negligence, battery, recklessness and violations of the Clean Air Act. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as medical monitoring expenses. A Connecticut trial court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion, citing the lack of evidence demonstrating any issue of fact as to physical injury. The trial court declined to recognize a cause of action for medical monitoring that would allow recovery for increased risk of future injury absent present injury. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds.
The Connecticut Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that Connecticut law would recognize a remedy for medical monitoring absent a present manifestation of physical harm where a “subclinical cellular injury” “substantially increase[s] the plaintiffs’ risk of cancer and other asbestos related diseases.” The court nonetheless dismissed plaintiffs’ claims based on their inability to prove that medical monitoring was “reasonably necessary.” In so ruling, the court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the necessity of medical monitoring could be established through generalized expert testimony concerning the harmful effects of asbestos exposure. Instead, the court held that expert evidence must speak to the plaintiffs’ specific conditions. The court stated: “[i]n the absence of expert testimony demonstrating the necessity of future testing, a fact finder would be unable to accurately conclude whether a plaintiff should recover for medical monitoring.”
As discussed in previous Alerts, there is no judicial consensus on whether medical monitoring claims are recognizable or the elements necessary to substantiate such claims. Even where such claims are recognized, plaintiffs often encounter obstacles in seeking medical monitoring relief, including, in particular, issues associated with exposure and causation. See January 2012 Alert, September 2011 Alert.